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TIGHTENING THE NOOSE ON TRIBAL
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION: DURO v. REINA
I. INTRODUCTION
From the commencement of our government, congress has passed acts
to regulate... intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as na-
tions [and] respect their rights .... All these acts ...manifestly
consider the several Indian nations as distinct political communities,
having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive,
and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is
not only acknowledged, but guarantied [sic] by the United States.'
These words of Chief Justice John Marshall laid the course for
American jurisprudence concerning Native Americans. The recognition
of Native American tribal sovereignty has been an important part of the
framework upon which federal Indian policy continues to be built. The
goal of the United States government toward Indian tribes and nations is
the promotion of sovereignty.2 Within the last twenty years, the nation's
highest court has demonstrated adherence to that goal repeatedly. In
fact, all three branches of the federal government have purported to es-
pouse the idea of sovereignty.3
Recently, however, several decisions by the United States Supreme
1. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556-57 (1832).
2. Indian Reorganization Act, § 1, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988).
3. In the executive branch, President Nixon introduced an Indian policy which promoted
Indian self-determination. 6 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 894 (July 8, 1970). President Reagan's
Indian policy was to "reaffirm dealing with Indian tribes on a government to government basis and
to pursue the policy of self-government for Indian tribes." 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 99 (Jan.
24, 1983).
Concerning the legislative branch, see generally Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1975, § 3, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450a-450n (1988); American Indian Religious Freedom
Act, § 1, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1996 (West Supp. 1991). For pollution control acts which treat tribes as
states in some instances, see Clean Air Act, § 108(i), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7601(d) (West. Supp. 1991);
Clean Water Act, § 506, 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (1988); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act, § 207(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9626 (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act, § 302(a),
42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-311(a) (1988).
For treatment by the judicial branch regarding sovereignty, see generally Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535 (1974); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 111
S. Ct. 905 (1991).
1
Factor: Tightening the Noose on Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction: Duro v. Rei
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1991
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27:225
Court have limited the governmental rights of these sovereign Indian na-
tions.' Duro v. Reina I is one such ruling. The judgment of the Court in
Duro was based on erroneous assumptions.' These mistaken assump-
tions led the Court to improper applications of the canons of construc-
tion that govern the interpretation of federal Indian law and usurpation
of congressional powers. 7 Eurocentric attitudes toward Native Ameri-
cans are apparently the culprit.8 The decision in Duro could result in
dangerous conditions in Indian country.9 In order that true tribal sover-
eignty continues to be upheld, Indian tribes must have criminal jurisdic-
tion over any Indian, including non-members, who commits a crime on
tribal land.
4. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v.
New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); In re Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76
(Wyo. 1988), aff'd by an equally divided court sub nom, Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406
(1989).
5. 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990).
6. The Duro Court assumed that a non-member Indian would be discriminated against in a
tribal court. Id. at 2063-65. A similar assumption about tribal courts appeared in Oliphant. 435 U.S.
at 210-12.
7. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191; Cotton Petro.
leum, 490 U.S. 163.
8. Eurocentrism toward Indian tribes is obvious in several Court decisions. In United States
v. Sandoval, the Court described the United States "as a superior and civilized nation." as compared
to Indian tribes. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913). In Ex parte Crow Dog, the
Court reasoned that the federal government could not prosecute an Indian for murder because:
It is a case where... [the] law... is sought to be extended over aliens and strangers; over
the members of a community separated by race, by tradition, by the instincts of a free
though savage life... which judges them by a standard made by others and not for them
... and makes no allowance for their inability to understand it. It tries them, not by their
peers... but by superiors of a different race ... and which is opposed... to the strongest
prejudices of their savage nature; one which measures the red man's revenge by the maxims
of the white man's morality.
Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883) (emphasis added). In United States v. Joseph, the
Court declared that Pueblos could not be Indians because "[they are peaceable, industrious, intelli-
gent, honest and virtuous people." United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 616 (1876).
A chauvinistic attitude in Brendale is evidenced by Justice Steven's statement that tribes retain
regulatory authority only over those lands on its reservation in which the "essential character" of the
land has been defined. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 433-35. In other words, the Indians must be using
lands for Indian activities like "hunting, fishing, and gather[ing] roots and berries." Id. This stereo-
typed outlook toward Indians was noted by other members of the Court. Id. at 464-65. See also
Russel L. Barsh, The Illusion of Religious Freedom for Indigenous Americans, 65 OR. L. REv. 363
(1986).
9. Federal law defines Indian country as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-
way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the
borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments,
the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running
through the same.
2
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Albert Duro was an enrolled member of the Torres-Martinez Band
of Cahuilla Mission Indians.10 A permanent resident of California,"
Duro was living on the Salt River Reservation at the time of events lead-
ing to this dispute.12 Two culturally distinct tribes, the Pima and the
Maricopa, make up the Pima-Maricopa Indian Community on the Salt
River Reservation.13 The community is a federally recognized tribe.14
Duro was not eligible for membership in the Pima-Maricopa Tribe.15
Hence, he could not vote, hold office or serve on a jury under the control
of the Pima-Maricopa Tribe. "6 However, Duro had lived on the reserva-
tion for several months and was employed by a community owned
business.
On June 15, 1984, Phillip Brown, a fourteen-year-old enrolled mem-
ber of the Gila River Indian Tribe, 7 was shot and killed on the Salt
River Reservation. On June 19, 1984, Duro was arrested by federal
agents and charged with murder in connection with Brown's death.18
Later, when the federal charges were dismissed, Duro was turned over to
the custody of the Pima-Maricopa Community Court. The community
court charged him with the illegal firing of a weapon on the reservation.' 9
Duro then filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the community
court did not have jurisdiction over him because he was not a member of
the tribe. Upon denial of that motion, Duro filed a writ of habeas corpus
in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. The dis-
trict court granted the writ, holding that the subjection of a non-member
Indian to tribal jurisdiction, where non-Indians are exempt, would result
in a breach of constitutional equal protection.20
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988).
10. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2056.
11. Petitioner's Brief at 2, Duro (No. 88-6546).
12. Respondent's Brief at 2-3, Duro (No. 88-6546).
13. Id. at 2.
14. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2056.
15. See SALT RIVER COMMUNITY CONST. art. 2, § 1.
16. SALT RIVER COMMUNITY CONST. art. VI, § 1; art. III, § 1.
17. The Gila River Tribe does not reside on the Salt River Reservation.
18. Duro was charged with murder and aiding and abetting murder in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2, 1111, 1153 (1988). Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2057. Under federal law, in Indian country the United
States government has, at least, concurrent jurisdiction over major felonies involving Indians while
tribal jurisdiction is exclusive for misdemeanors involving Indians. See Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1153 (1988).
19. The Indian Civil Rights Act, § 202, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1988) prohibits tribal courts from
enforcing criminal sanctions over one year and five thousand dollars. Therefore, tribal charges in-
volve only misdemeanors.
20. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2058.
1991]
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Reversing the decision of the district court,2 ' the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that tribal courts retain jurisdiction over crimes
committed "by Indians against other Indians without regard to tribal
membership. ' 22 The court determined that the federal statutory scheme
left criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians in the hands of the
tribes. The notion that the exercise of such jurisdiction over non-mem-
bers would be a denial of equal protection rights was rejected.23 Finally,
the court pointed out the potential jurisdictional void if tribes were de-
nied criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians.24
Application of the statutory scheme to Indians was based upon
"their status as Indians. ' 21 This treatment emphasized the unimpor-
tance of the distinctions between member and non-member Indians. 26
Additionally, tribes retain jurisdiction over all crimes not divested by the
federal government. 2v Because most crimes by Indians against Indians
are specifically excepted in the statutory scheme, tribes must retain crimi-
nal jurisdiction over non-member Indians.2"
The court then determined that the exercise of tribal criminal juris-
diction over Duro was not a violation of his equal protection rights.29
The court of appeals pointed out that federal jurisdiction over Indians is
based upon a "totality of circumstances ... in which no one factor is
dispositive."3 ° Accordingly, tribal courts using this process to define tri-
bal criminal jurisdiction are not guilty of impermissible racial discrimina-
tion.31 Additionally, the court of appeals approved the Pima-Maricopa
21. 821 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1987), modified, 851 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct.
2053 (1990). Between the time of the original Ninth Circuit decision and the revision in 1988,
another circuit court dealt with a similar case. In Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486, 493 (8th Cir.
1988), the Eighth Circuit held that a tribal court's exercise ofjurisdiction over non-member Indians
was inconsistent with a tribe's dependent status. The Duro court's revision rejected the analysis of
the Greywater opinion. Duro, 851 F.2d at 1139 n.l.
22. Duro, 851 F.2d at 1143.
23. The equal protection rights to which Duro was entitled are found not in the United States
Constitution but in the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988). In Talton v. Mayes, the
Court declared that the Fourteenth Amendment was applicable only to the states, but was not rele-
vant to Indian tribes. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). In 1968 the Indian Civil Rights Act
was passed giving Indians a comparable Indian Bill of Rights. Indian Civil Rights Act, § 202, 25
U.S.C. § 1302 (1988).
24. Duro, 851 F.2d at 1145-46.
25. Duro, 851 F.2d at 1142 (quoting United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 642 (1977)).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1143.
28. Id. at 1142-43.
29. Id. at 1143-45. The district court had contended that the extension of tribal court jurisdic-
tion to non-member Indians was impermissibly based on race. Id. at 1143.
30. Id. at 1144 (quoting Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Jour-
ney Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARiz. L. REV. 503, 518 (1976)).
31. Id.
[Vol. 27:225
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tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction because of Duro's contacts with the
community.32 The court of appeals further stated that the extension of
criminal jurisdiction to non-member Indians would result in better law
enforcement on the reservation.3 3
III. LAW PRIOR TO THE CASE
A. Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Statutory Scheme
Criminal jurisdiction within Indian country is a complex subject
with confusing procedural and policy issues. The confusion arises pri-
marily from the several statutes controlling jurisdiction. The Major
Crimes Act,34 the General Crimes Act,3" the Assimilative Crimes Act,36
and Public Law 28037 all impose different jurisdictional schemes on In-
dian country. Within these statutes, the legislature has attempted to rec-
oncile traditional American criminal justice with the concept of Indian
tribal sovereignty. The general principle of sovereignty mandates that
Indian tribes have control over their people and their territory.3"
In Exparte Crow Dog,39 the United States Supreme Court addressed
a case in which a Sioux, Crow Dog, killed Spotted Tail, another Sioux.
Crow Dog was punished for his crime by his tribe in the traditional Sioux
manner. He was required to provide restitution to the victim's family or
relatives.' However, officials of the territory of Dakota, in which the
Sioux reservation was located, were not satisfied. Crow Dog was charged
in federal district court with murder. Upon conviction, Crow Dog was
sentenced to death.41 Upon the filing of a writ of habeas corpus, the case
was heard by the United States Supreme Court.42 The Court ruled that
tribes had exclusive jurisdiction over a criminal prosecution which in-
volved Indians on the reservation.43 As a result, Crow Dog was freed.
The United States Congress, in response to Ex parte Crow Dog,
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1145.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1988).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1988), amended by Indian Civil Rights Act, §§ 401-406, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1321-1326 (1988).
38. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
39. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
40. KIRKE KiCKINGBIRD ET AL., INDIAN JURISDICTION 23 (1983).
41. Ex pare Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557.
42. Id. at 556.
43. Id. at 557-58.
1991]
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passed the Major Crimes Act.' This Act extends federal criminal juris-
diction into Indian country for certain crimes. Federal jurisdiction now
covers extreme crimes, such as murder, sexual offenses, and arson, which
are committed in Indian country. This was the first statute to extend
federal jurisdiction to crimes committed by Indians within Indian coun-
try. However, the courts had previously assumed some limited criminal
jurisdiction over Indian country.
In 1817, Congress passed the General Crimes Act,45 also known as
the Federal Enclave Act. This Act provides general federal jurisdiction
over federal enclaves such as national parks and forests.4 6 An important
exception to the grant of federal jurisdiction is that no jurisdiction exists
where only Indians are involved, where treaty rights are applicable to the
situation, or where an Indian has already been punished by tribal law.47
State criminal laws were incorporated into the federal legal system
by the Assimilative Crimes Act.48 In the absence of an applicable federal
statute, this law extends the criminal laws of the surrounding state into
federal enclaves.4 9 Therefore, if an act was not a crime under federal law
but was punishable under the surrounding state's law, it became tanta-
mount to a federal offense. In 1946, the United States Supreme Court
specifically applied the Assimilative Crimes Act to Indian country.50
While the same exceptions applying to the General Crimes Act arguably
44. The Major Crimes Act reads:
Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person
any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnaping, maiming, a felony
under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a danger-
ous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, burglary, robbery, and a fel-
ony under section 661 of this title within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same
law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1988).
45. The General Crimes Act reads:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United States
as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the In-
dian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person
or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian
country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty
stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian
tribes respectively.
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988).
46. KICKINGBIRD, supra note 40, at 17.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1988).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988).
50. Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711 (1946).
6
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apply to the Assimilative Crimes Act,51 this proposition has not been
universally accepted. 2
A final aspect of the federal criminal statutory scheme in Indian
country is the effect of Public Law 280.13 This law gives particular states
civil and criminal jurisdiction over either all or specified tribes in the
named states. 4 In those states, the affected Indian land would be subject
to the criminal and civil laws of the state but not regulatory statutes.55
Even if a state enacted regulatory laws with criminal enforcement provi-
sions, those sanctions should not apply to Indians in Indian country in a
Public Law 280 state. 6
The jurisdictional confusion in Indian country moves from the theo-
retical realm to reality when authorities attempt to apply the statutes.
Several factors must be considered in determining whether a particular
sovereign has jurisdiction. Is the state in question a Public Law 280
state? Is the crime a felony or a misdemeanor? Is either a perpetrator or
a victim an Indian? If either is an Indian, is he enrolled in a recognized
tribe? Given varying circumstances, each of these factors could change
the propriety of jurisdiction.
B. Judicial Interpretation of Jurisdiction
The first major judicial attack on the sovereignty of tribes within
their borders after the passage of the Major Crimes Act was United
States v. McBratney.7 That decision gave states the right to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over crimes occurring between non-Indians within
51. See Judith Royster & Rory Fausett, Fresh Pursuit Onto Native American Reservations:
State Rights "To Pursue Savage Hostile Indian Marauders Across The Border," 59 U. COLO. L. REV.
191, 221 n.53 (1988); Clinton, supra note 30, at 534-35.
52. See Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 1987) (Sneed, J. dissenting), rev'd, 110
S. Ct. 2053 (1990). See also Karl Erhart, Comment, Jurisdiction Over Nonmember Indians on Reser-
vations, 1980 ARIz. ST. L.J. 727, 743-45.
53. Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 2(a), 67 Stat. 588 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(A) (1988)) (com-
monly referred to as "Public Law 280").
54. With regard to criminal jurisdiction, Public Law 280 states:
Each of the States or Territories listed [in this section] .. .shall have jurisdiction over
offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country listed [in this
section] ... to the same extent that such State or Territory has jurisdiction over offenses
committed elsewhere within the State or Territory, and the criminal laws of such State or
Territory shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have
elsewhere within the State or Territory.
Public Law 280, § 2(a). The states which presently assert full or partial criminal jurisdiction under
Public Law 280 are Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Id.
55. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 390 (1976).
56. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 211 (1987) (state could not
regulate gambling on reservation under Public Law 280).
57. 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
1991]
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Indian country." While that decision continues to be criticized today, 9
it has been cited as controlling lawA0
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,61 the United States Supreme
Court ruled that Indian tribal courts have no jurisdiction over non-Indi-
ans.62 This decision was in direct conflict with previous decisions63 and
has been severely criticized. 64 The Court purported to base its decision
on the historical and legal annals of criminal jurisdiction within Indian
country, 65 which exhibited an ageless presumption against tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. 6 While the Court recognized that tribes
retain aspects of sovereignty, 67 the Court maintained that a tribal exer-
cise of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians would be "inconsistent
with [tribal] status' 68 as dependent nations. 69 By removing jurisdiction
over non-Indians from tribal courts, the Supreme Court actually made it
more difficult for Native American nations to maintain order and safety
on their lands.
The central issue in United States v. Wheeler70 was whether tribal
power to subject tribal members to the criminal jurisdiction of the tribe is
an aspect of inherent sovereignty or a power delegated by the federal
government. 71 The Supreme Court concluded that criminal jurisdiction
58. Id. at 624.
59. See KICKINGBIRD, supra note 40, at 22 (the authors argue that McBratney should be lim-
ited to its particular facts); Royster & Fausett, supra note 51, at 210 nn.36, 37.
60. Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896); New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S.
496 (1946).
61. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
62. Id. at 195.
63. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (recognizing the sovereign power of
Indian nations over matters affecting their members and territory); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,
221-22 (1959) (recognizing the power of tribal courts over non-Indians concerning actions within
Indian country); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F.2d 89, 92 (8th
Cir. 1956) (recognizing "the inherent rights of sovereignty" which allowed the Oglala Sioux nation
to make and enforce criminal laws).
64. See, eg., Catherine B. Stetson, Decriminalizing Tribal Codes: A Response to Oliphant, 9
AM. INDIAN L. REv. 51 (1981); Robert A. Williams, Jr., TheAlgebra of Federal Indian Law: The
Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L.
REV. 219 (1986); Jeff Larson, Note, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe: A Jurisdictional Quag-
mire, 24 S.D. L. REv. 217 (1979).
65. Oliphant, 435 U.S., at 197-211.
66. Id. at 206.
67. Id. at 208.
68. Id. (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom, Oli-
phant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)).
69. Id.
70. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
71. Id.
8
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over tribal members is an inherent sovereign power.7 2 The tribe in ques-
tion, the Navajo, had never surrendered this power,73 nor had the power
been implicitly divested by the dependent status of the tribe.74 In
Wheeler, the Court acknowledged that tribes retain all inherent sovereign
powers until Congress acts to remove those powers. 75 The Court also
reaffirmed that Indian tribes possess "sovereignty over both their mem-
bers and their territory. 76
In Ross v. Neff, 7 the Tenth Circuit ruled that police officers
subordinate to the state of Oklahoma have no jurisdiction in Indian
country. 78 The court reasoned that unless Congress has made specific
exceptions, only the tribe and the federal government have criminal juris-
diction in Indian country.79 The extension of state law into Indian coun-
try was rejected even though the court recognized the possibility that a
jurisdictional void might result if neither tribal nor federal entities exer-
cised jurisdiction. 0
A review of prior law reveals a tale of confusion involved in criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country. Therefore, only a generalized summary is
proffered here. Crimes committed by Indians within Indian country
which are specifically included in the Major Crimes Act are under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.81 Non-Indians committing a
crime against Indians within Indian country are under the jurisdiction of
the federal government.8 Crimes committed by Indians within Indian
country which do not give rise to the authority of the federal govern-
ment, usually minor crimes, are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
tribal courts. 83 Finally, crimes committed by non-Indians against other
72. Id. at 323-24.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 326.
75. Id. at 322-23.
76. Id. at 323 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).
77. 905 F.2d 1349 (loth Cir. 1990).
78. Id. at 1352. The lack of criminal jurisdiction by state police officers within Indian country
only applies to Indian crimes as specified in 18 U.S.C. § 1152. A state does have criminal jurisdic-
tion within Indian country over crimes occurring between non-Indians. See United States v. Mc-
Bratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 241-42 (1896); New York ex
rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 497 (1946).
79. Ross, 905 F.2d at 1352.
80. Id. at 1353.
81. Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 713 (1946).
82. Id. at 714; Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 271-73 (1913). But see Indian Reserva-
tion Special Magistrate: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 13 (1986) (the Department of Justice takes the view that state criminal jurisdiction is concur-
rent with federal jurisdiction for crimes by a non-Indian against an Indian). For a criticism of this
view, see Royster & Fausett, supra note 51, at 220-21 n.52.
83. United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1231 (9th Cir. 1980).
1991]
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non-Indians within Indian country fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the state.84
IV. DECISION
A. The Majority
In Duro v. Reina,85 the Supreme Court ruled that tribal courts do
not have criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians. 6 The Court
concluded that tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians is inconsistent with a
tribe's status as a dependent sovereign 7.8  The Court recognized that a
basic attribute of sovereignty is the power of criminal jurisdiction over
any person within a sovereign's borders. 8 However, the Court said that
Native American tribes can no longer be thought of as sovereign in this
sense.89 Focusing on what it called the "unique and limited character"90
of tribal sovereignty, the Court concluded that the power of tribes to
control internal relations did not include power over non-members.91
Since tribes are dependent on the United States, they may no longer exer-
cise power concerned with external relations.92 Understanding criminal
jurisdiction over non-members for crimes occurring within tribal borders
to be the exercise of an external power, the Court ruled that tribes had
been divested of that power.93
The Court also asserted that a tribe only had power to control its
"internal self-governance."94 Given Duro's inability to directly partici-
pate in Pima-Maricopa governmental functions, the majority ruled that
he remained outside the tribe's jurisdiction.95 Criminal actions by non-
member Indians against the tribe are viewed as not affecting "internal
governance," 96 and therefore, these actions are outside the jurisdiction of
84. United States v. MoBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881).
85. 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990).
86. Id. at 2059.
87. Id See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978). For a critical exam-
ination of the "inconsistent status" doctrine, see Robert Laurence, Governmental Power In and
Around Indian Country, MIN. DEV. ON INDIAN LANDS 3-1, 3-6 to 3-10 (Rocky Mountain Mineral
Law Foundation ed., 1989).
88. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2060.
89. Id.
90. Id. (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2060-61.
96. Id. at 2060.
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the tribe.97
Although the respondent argued that historical evidence supported
tribal court jurisdiction over non-member Indians, his claim was re-
jected.98 The fact that federal jurisdictional statutes9 9 and regulations' °°
apply to all Indians regardless of membership status was apparently irrel-
evant. 101 Instead, the Court focused on a few early Solicitor General
opinions that indicated criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians
might not exist for the tribes. 102
The Court also refused to grant tribes criminal jurisdiction over
non-member Indians because to do so would introduce "unwarranted in-
trusions... [upon the] personal liberty" 13 of those non-member Indi-
ans. 11 Because tribal membership is limited, the constitutional rights of
non-member Indians could supposedly be violated in the courts of a tribe
with which the non-member might be unfamiliar.105 The Court consid-
ered the contacts test promoted by the court of appeals, whereby any
Indian with close ties to a reservation 10 6 would be subject to that tribe's
criminal jurisdiction.10 7 The majority determined this test to be unrea-
sonable because a distinction would have to be drawn between non-Indi-
ans and non-member Indians.10 8
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's convincing argument, the Court de-
nied that a new jurisdictional void would occur as a result of the Duro
decision.109 The claim of an impending jurisdictional void was compared
to an argument rejected in Oliphant.110 According to the Court, a suffi-
cient federal jurisdictional scheme was in place to meet law enforcement
97. Id. at 2060-61.
98. Id. at 2061-63.
99. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152-1153 (1988).
100. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.2(a) (1991).
101. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2062.
102. Id. at 2063.
103. Id. (quoting Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978)).
104. Id. at 2063-65.
105. Id. at 2064.
106. Examples are marriage, employment, and residency. For a similar rule in the federal civil
jurisdictional field, see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). But see Peter
Fabish, Note, The Decline of Tribal Sovereignty: The Journey from Dicta to Dogma in Duro v.
Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990), 66 WASH. L. REv. 567 (1991). The commentator suggests the Court
correctly rejected the contacts test because "[i]t would be impractical and unnecessary to require
tribal courts to perform a complex analysis of interests for every minor crime within their jurisdic-
tion." Id. at 584.
107. Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990).
108. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2065.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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needs." I If any void would materialize, the Court laid the responsibility
of mending it with Congress."1 2
B. The Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Brennan113 attacked the majority's view that
the Duro decision necessarily followed from the Oliphant reasoning. 114
He criticized the majority for erroneously basing its conclusion on the
reasoning from a case involving non-Indians, not non-member Indi-
ans.1I 5 Since Congress had explicitly exempted Indian against Indian
crimes, Brennan asserted there was an implicit understanding that tribes
retained jurisdiction over those crimes. 116
Brennan also argued that a jurisdictional void would result from the
decision in Duro.117 Moreover, the fact that the void would result under
the majority's holding supported the conclusion that the intent of Con-
gress was that tribes were to have jurisdiction over all Indians within
Indian country. 1 Since Congress did not distinguish between member
and non-member Indians in the jurisdictional scheme, Brennan argued
that logic dictated Congress had intended for tribes to retain criminal
jurisdiction over non-members.119
Brennan countered the "inconsistent status" argument of the major-
ity by pointing out that the status of the tribes is determined by Con-
gress.120 Therefore, since jurisdiction over non-member Indians lies with
the tribes, it is clear that criminal jurisdiction over all Indians within
Indian country is consistent with the dependent status of the tribes.121
Finally, Brennan addressed the potential for discrimination against
non-members in tribal court. He cited the Indian Civil Rights Act 22 as
a vehicle to guarantee the rights of any person prosecuted in a tribal
court.123 Brennan specifically referred to the equal protection provision
111. Id.
112. Id at 2066.
113. Justice Brennan's dissent was joined by Justice Marshall.
114. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2066-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 2068.
116. Id. at 2069.
117. Id. at 2070.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2071.
121. Id.
122. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1988).
123. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2072 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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and the due process clause,12 4 along with the remedy of habeas corpus, 125
as an affirmation of the rights of a person tried before a tribal court. 26
He concluded that the guarantee of these rights "ensures that each indi-
vidual is tried in a... fair proceeding."' 27
This decision has deprived all Indian tribes of an inherent right to
maintain safety and order within their borders. 28 In reaching its deci-
sion, the Court professed to have followed an analysis similar to other
Indian law cases emphasizing tribal sovereignty. 129 However, a closer
examination of the Court's holding in Duro shows their decision was
reached in spite of this principle and the corresponding congressional
intent, not because of them.
V. ANALYSIS
When the Supreme Court denied tribal criminal jurisdiction over
non-member Indians, it failed to consider the realities of the situation in
Indian country. 30 The decision set over two centuries of federal policy
and precedent on its head. 3' In reaching its decision, the Court disre-
garded established rules regarding Indian law in order to support the
desired outcome.' 32 In the process, the Court revealed a thought process
dominated by a Eurocentric bias that has affected prior Indian law
rulings.
133
The Court claimed that the Duro decision was a necessary extension
of previous cases.' 34 However, as Justice Brennan pointed out in his dis-
sent, the congressional enactments relied on in Oliphant were concerned
124. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1988).
125. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1988).
126. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2072 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2067.
129. Id. at 2059.
130. See Nell J. Newton and Philip S. Deloria, Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction Over Non-
member Indians, 16 ANN. FED. BAR ASS'N: INDIAN L. CONF. 89 (1991). The authors maintain
that, instead of only two types of Indians in Indian country, there are three. First are tribal members
living on their own reservations who are subject to tribal and federal jurisdiction. The second type is
Indians enrolled in one tribe but living on the reservation of another. Even though Duro will divest
tribal jurisdiction over Indians in this category, they remain "Indians" for other federal purposes.
Finally, there are those who racially are Indian but are not enrolled in any tribe for whatever reason.
The authors contend that the third group is larger than anyone imagines and will multiply the
negative effects of Duro on the reservation. Id. at 96-97.
131. Id. at 90.
132. Id. at 99-102.
133. See supra note 8.
134. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2059.
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with non-Indians. 3 ' The Court incorrectly applied the same analysis in
Duro that was used in Oliphant to divest tribal jurisdiction over non-
member Indians.136 Further, the fact that the majority opinion quoted,
as a compelling argument against tribal jurisdiction over non-members,
an incorrect summary from Wheeler underscores the weakness of the
Court's holding in Duro.137
The Duro majority acknowledged that the enforcement of laws
against every person within a sovereign's borders was an inherent
power.138 Nonetheless, the Court claimed that Oliphant recognized the
divestiture of all jurisdiction except that needed to control internal rela-
tions among tribal members. 139 However, Oliphant only dealt with juris-
diction over non-Indians. 1" The Court also admitted that the power of
criminal jurisdiction over non-members had never been explicitly
divested. 41 The logical conclusion, then, is that since no such divestiture
has occurred, the tribes must retain criminal jurisdiction over non-
members. 142
In relying upon Oliphant to fortify its decision, the Court neglected
to mention sections of the majority opinion contrary to its holding in
Duro.4" The Oliphant Court looked to In re Mayfield 1" in which Na-
tive American nations were held to retain criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians.145 Also cited in Oliphant was a 1960 Senate Report that ac-
knowledged "Indian tribal law is enforcible [sic] against Indians only
.... 2,14 These authorities were used by the Oliphant majority to prove
that tribes no longer had criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. With-
out commenting on criminal jurisdiction over non-members, it is clear
135. Id. at 2068 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. The Duro Court stated, tribes "cannot try nonmembers in tribal courts." 110 S. Ct. at 2059
(quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)). While this statement is found in
Wheeler, that quote is a summary of the holding in Oliphant, a case concerned solely with non-
Indians. A correct summary of Oliphant would have stated that tribes cannot try non-Indians in
tribal courts. Therefore, the use of Wheeler to prove the particular point is an elementary jurispru-
dential error.
138. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2060.
139. Id. at 2060-61.
140. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978).
141. Id. at 197. See, eg., FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1986)
("[P]owers ... vested in an Indian tribe are .. .inherent powers ... which [have] never been
extinguished.")
142. "[U]ntil Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers." Wheeler, 435 U.S.
at 323.
143. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 204-05, 211.
144. 141 U.S. 107, 115-16 (1891).
145. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 204 (citing In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. at 115-16).
146. Id. at 205 (quoting from S. REP. No. 1686, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1960)),
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that a presumption in favor of tribal jurisdiction over all Indians should
have existed.
In a similar vein, the Court's reliance on Wheeler was ill-founded.
The issue in Wheeler was whether an Indian tribe draws its power from
the federal government or whether it derives its power to punish offenses
committed against the tribe from the concept of tribal sovereignty.147
The Court agreed that the tribe had never surrendered the sovereign
power to punish tribal offenders.148 However, Wheeler did not address
non-member Indians. The word "non-member" was only used in dicta
and even then was used incorrectly at least once.14 9 In fact, whenever
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians was discussed in
Wheeler, the power of tribes to try non-members was upheld. 50 Clearly,
Duro does not follow from Oliphant and Wheeler; rather, it conflicts with
them.1
51
The Court also inaccurately stated that the dependent status of the
tribes provided a basis for inferring a divestiture of tribal criminal juris-
diction over non-members.152 It is well established that Indian tribes can
no longer determine their external relations, such as entering into treaties
or trade agreements with foreign governments.153  However, it is a
strained leap of logic to the Court's determination that the enforcement
of criminal laws against members of the tribal community within tribal
boundaries was not a power the tribe would need to control the internal
workings of the reservation.' 54 The majority seemingly set internal crim-
inal jurisdiction on equal footing with tribal "foreign" relations.
147. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 328-30.
148. Id. at 323-24.
149. See supra note 137.
150. "Congress carried forward the intra-Indian offense exception because 'the tribes have exclu-
sive jurisdiction' of such offenses .... " Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 324-25 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 474,
23d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1834)). The Court again pointed out Congress' acknowledgement of tribal
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians. "Their right of self government and to administer justice
among themselves ... has never been questioned; and... the Government has carefully abstained
from ... punishing crimes committed by one Indian against another in the Indian country." Id. at
325-26 n.23 (quoting S. REP. No. 268, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 10 (1870)).
151. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
152. Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2060 (1990).
153. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (the two cases forbade tribes entering into commercial
or governmental relations with foreign powers); and Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543
(1823) (denying tribes the right to freely alienate their land).
154. It is easier to understand when the results of other Indian law cases are considered. See
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). It also becomes easier to understand when the attitude of the Supreme
Court justices toward Indian law cases are considered. One commentator suggested the Indian law
decisions from the Court were a result of the Justices' dislike of writing opinions on the subject. See
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Distinguishing between member and non-member Indians in rela-
tion to governmental functions has been approved in other instances1 l5
For example, in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian
Reservation, states were held to have the power to tax non-member Indi-
ans residing on reservations." 6 The Court in Duro cited Colville to war-
rant equating non-member Indians with non-Indians for the purposes of
tribal criminal jurisdictional. 157 However, the language the Duro court
extracted from Colville concerned a state's power to tax, a far cry from
tribal criminal jurisdiction.' 58 The Duro Court failed to include in its
discussion of Colville the fact that the power of the tribe to tax non-
members was unaffected by the presence of the same taxing power in the
state.' 9 The only grounds for the member and non-member distinction
in Colville was the clarification of state taxing power in Indian
country. 160
The Duro majority's reliance on Montana v. United States'6 for the
proposition that tribal courts have no jurisdiction over non-members162 is
equally difficult to reconcile. The Court established that non-members
were not within tribal civil jurisdiction in that case.' 63 However, the
Court simultaneously established an exception to that rule. Non-mem-
bers can be subject to tribal jurisdiction if the non-member's activity af-
fects the economic stability, self-governing ability, or the health and
welfare of the tribe.' 6 The Montana reasoning, however, should lead to
a result opposite of the Duro decision. Certainly, criminal activity within
the tribe's border adversely affects that tribe's integrity and welfare. 165
Russel L. Barsh, Is There Any Indian "Law" Left? A Review of the Supreme Court's 1982 Term, 59
WASH. L. REv. 863, 863-64 (1984) (citing BOB WOODWARD & ScOTr ARMSTRONo, THE BRETH-
REN 57, 58, 359, 412 (1980)).
155. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 160-61
(1980).
156. Id. at 161.
157. Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2060 (1990) (quoting Colville, 447 U.S. at 161).
158. Colville, 447 U.S. at 160.
159. Id. at 152-53.
160. See Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2067-68 n.l. The Colville Court intimated that ifa federal statute
existed which explicitly or implicitly preempted state taxation of non-member Indians, it would have
disallowed Washington's assertion of taxing power. Colville, 447 U.S. at 160-61. Likewise, the fact
that jurisdiction over minor crimes is denied by federal statutes to state and federal governments,
thereby implicitly remaining with the tribes, leads to the conclusion that Duro's claim should have
been denied. See supra notes 44-56, 81-86 and accompanying text.
161. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
162. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2060-61.
163. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
164. Id. at 565-66.
165. See Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2068 n.l (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The majority's reasoning that Duro's inability to enter into the polit-
ical process of the Pima-Maricopa tribe precluded tribal criminal juris-
diction is inconsistent with prior case law. In Williams v. Lee,'66 the
Supreme Court concluded that it was "immaterial" that a respondent in
a civil case was not a tribal member. 167 Simply the fact that the transac-
tion in question took place on the reservation made jurisdiction with the
tribal court appropriate. 168 The lack of assent by non-members to tribal
sovereignty was also rejected as a limit to jurisdiction in Merrion v. Ji-
carilla Apache Tribe.6 9 The Court declared "the nonmember's presence
and conduct on Indian lands are conditioned by the limitations the tribe
may choose to impose."' 17
A United States citizen travelling into a foreign country should un-
derstand that he would be subject to all the laws of the foreign country,
even if he had no chance of obtaining citizenship in that foreign na-
tion. 17 1 If the individual does not wish to place himself within the juris-
diction of the other country, he must simply remain outside that
sovereign's borders.
Historically, tribes have retained power over all Indians in their ter-
ritory. 172 This is emphasized by the fact that Congress specifically acted
to confer federal jurisdiction over different crimes in Indian country. 173
Again, the fact that Congress' 74 and the Supreme Court 175 recognized
the need for such explicit action underscores the fact that the inherent
sovereign power of Native American nations to exercise criminal juris-
diction 176 over non-member Indians has never been taken away and
therefore remains intact.
1 7 7
166. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
167. Id. at 223.
168. Id.
169. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
170. Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
171. Justice Brennan pointed out that if the inability to participate in government is a bar to
criminal jurisdiction then states "could not prosecute nonresidents, and [the United States] could not
prosecute aliens who violate our laws." Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2071 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2067-69. See COHEN, supra note 142, at 360 (Cohen assumes Indian
tribes had jurisdiction over all Indians within their territory, based in part on Congressional acts and
Solicitor opinions). See also Douglas Cubberley, Note, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Nonmember Indi-
ans: The Legal Void After Duro v. Reina, 16 Am. INDIAN L. REv. 213, 241 (1991).
173. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152-1153 (1988).
174. Id.
175. Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
176. The exercise of criminal jurisdiction is an aspect of sovereignty. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2060.
177. Any sovereign power which has never been extinguished remains a power of the sovereign.
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). The Wheeler Court claimed that tribal court
criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians was an area in which the "implicit divestiture of
sovereignty" had occurred. Id. at 326. However, the cases cited in support of that claim do not
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Both the Court 78 and Congress1 79 have recognized that Indians
constitute a separate class, based not on a racial status but a political
classification.' Therefore, the subjection of non-member Indians to tri-
bal criminal jurisdiction while prohibiting the subjection of non-Indians
is not illegal racial discrimination. It is simply a recognition of the stated
United States policy of encouraging Indian self-government. 1"
The presence of a jurisdictional void in Indian country1 12 has be-
come a reality. The current jurisdictional scheme covers all major crimes
in Indian country and all other crimes except those occurring between
Indians, those crimes already punished in tribal court, and those covered
by treaty provisions. 183 While the Court recognized the serious effect
minor crimes'84 could have on Indian communities,' 85 the Court refused
to grant tribes jurisdiction over those crimes.' 86 This denial, coupled
with the absence of jurisdiction over minor intra-Indian crimes by the
federal and state governments,' 87 clearly leaves a void.' 8
The Court also stated that any potential void was not enough to
show that non-member jurisdiction belonged to the tribes.'8 9 However,
in Wheeler the Court cited the possible absence of power over law break-
ers as a reason for their decision. 190 The Court never attempted to ex-
plain why "undesirable consequences"' 191 in one case compeled
stand for such a proposition. Those cases dealt with specific powers and can not be generalized to
cover all relations between tribes and non-members. The Court itself recognized that only Congress
can remove specific sovereign powers. Id. at 323. The only case which was cited that refers to
criminal jurisdiction was Oliphant which dealt with non-Indians. Citing Oliphant as a precedent for
the claim that tribal courts have no jurisdiction over non-member Indians is incorrect. See supra
note 137.
178. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
179. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1988).
180. Morton, 417 U.S. at 549.
181. Indian Reorganization Act, § 1, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988). See also supra note 3.
182. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2070 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
183. See supra notes 39-56 and 81-84 and accompanying text.
184. Examples of such minor crimes are assault, domestic disputes, and the illegal discharge of a
firearm.
185. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2065.
186. Id.
187. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
188. The dangerous situation that could develop in Indian country is evidenced in the declara-
tion of the Tenth Circuit that a state could not assume jurisdiction in Indian country even if the
federal government and the tribe yielded their law enforcement responsibilities. Ross v. Neff, 905
F.2d 1349, 1353 (10th Cir. 1990). See also In re Denetclaw, 320 P.2d 697, 701 (Ariz. 1958) (the Ross
court cited Denetclaw as another example of courts declaring themselves unable to enforce laws
where they have no jurisdiction).
189. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2065-66.
190. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 330 (1978).
191. Id.
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jurisdiction, but equally undesirable consequences in another case did
not. 192
Congress has realized a jurisdictional void exists in Indian coun-
try193 and has undertaken temporary action to remedy it.'94 While this
enactment has provided a momentary respite, it is clear that more far-
reaching action is needed. Ironically, the Supreme Court provided a
range of possible solutions to the problem within the Duro decision. 195
The Court's suggestion that Public Law 280 be utilized' 96 to close
the jurisdictional void is not viable. Tribes that still retain criminal and
civil jurisdiction do not wish to surrender it.197 Many states that did
assume jurisdiction under Public Law 280 have since renounced it, refus-
ing to exercise jurisdiction under it.'98
Another possible solution is the development of tribal-state com-
pacts or tribal-tribal compacts. New Mexico enjoys a tribal-state com-
pact which allows tribal police officers to act as state officers when
arresting non-Indians.' 99 The Attorney General of Oklahoma recently
issued an opinion which said such agreements would be constitutional in
the state of Oklahoma. 2' However, a previous opinion by the same offi-
cial,2"' which held otherwise,20 2 and the presence of a new Attorney
192. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2065-66.
193. 137 CONG. REc. H2988 (1991) (comments of Rep. Miller).
194. Defense Appropriations Act ("D.A.A."), Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1892,
1893 (1990). This addition to the D.A.A. was a temporary amendment to the Indian Civil Rights
Act, § 201, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1988). The basic aim of the provision was preservation of tribal
jurisdiction over all Indians. It ceased to have effect after September 30, 1991.
195. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2066.
196. Id.
197. This is evidenced by the fact that since the 1968 amendments to Public Law 280 (tribal
consent is required before a state can assume jurisdiction), no tribe has consented.
198. See Duro 110 S. Ct. at 2066; Royster & Fausett, supra note 51, at 215-16 n.44. In Duro, the
Court pointed out that Arizona clearly indicated its desire to not have criminal jurisdiction over
Indian country within Arizona.
199. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-11 (Michie 1990).
200. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. Okla. No. 32 (Mar 1, 1991). The opinion stated that cross-deputiza-
tion agreements under 25 U.S.C. § 2804 were constitutional under the laws of Oklahoma. The opin-
ion also stated that tribal-state cooperative agreements under OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 1221 (1981)
would be constitutional.
201. Robert Henry, Attorney General of Oklahoma.
202. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. Okla. 197. This opinion was based on an understanding of OKLA.
CONST. art. II, § 12, which states, "No member of Congress from this State, or person holding any
office of trust or profit under the laws of any other State, or of the United States, shall hold any office
of trust or profit under the laws of this State." In withdrawing this opinion, the Oklahoma Attorney
General stated that 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. Okla. 197 could not be supported by existing case law. 1990
Op. Att'y Gen. Okla. No. 32, p. 14 n.7 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1989);
Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959)).
An earlier opinion by an Oklahoma Attorney General, 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. Okla. 345, which
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General in Oklahoma should indicate that obtaining such compacts may
not be a panacea. Also, jurisdiction through agreement is based upon the
implicit assumption that tribes do not have sovereign power over their
own territory. 0 3
The Court also recommended that Congress should address the
problem of a jurisdictional void.2" Congress heeded the Court's direc-
tive and on May 14, 1991, a bill210 was passed in the House of Represent-
atives that would recognize that tribes have always had the right to
enforce criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians within Indian
country.20 6 This bill serves a dual purpose. First, it would solve the
problem of a jurisdictional void. Second, this legislation recognizes that
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians is an inherent
power.2"7 The Court's reaction to this legislation is difficult to anticipate.
The Court recognizes that Congress "has the ultimate authority over In-
dian affairs."20 8 However, the Court has also indicated that any legisla-
tion which subjected a United States citizen" 9 to the authority of a
criminal tribunal where the citizen's constitutional rights were not guar-
anteed would be subject to judicial scrutiny.210 The Duro opinion indi-
cated that the Indian Civil Rights Act was an insufficient counterpart to
the United States Bill of Rights.21'
VI. CONCLUSION
A careful probe of the Duro decision evidences a bounty of inconsis-
tencies and incorrect conclusions. Traditional, well-established concepts
conflicted with 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. Okla. 197 by allowing cross-deputization and had apparently
been overlooked when the 1984 opinion was issued, was modified to correspond to the opinion issued
on March 1, 1991.
203. Recently, in Oklahoma, the real danger of a lack of law enforcement apparently overrode
objections to surrendering some aspects of sovereignty. The leaders of the Sac and Fox Nation and
the Iowa Tribe of Oklahoma signed a cross-deputization agreement with Governor David Walters.
Walters, Tribes Approve Law Enforcement Pact, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 3, 1991, § A6; Indian Tribes,
Walters Sign Law Enforcement Compacts, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 3, 1991, at 10. Agreements
between four tribes, including the Sac and Fox, Iowa, Citizen Band Potawatomi, and Kickapoo were
also signed. The stated purpose of these agreements was to "improve law enforcement.., within
each tribe's boundaries." Walters, Tribes Approve Law Enforcement Pact, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 3,
1991, at A6.
204. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2066.
205. H.R. 972, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
206. 137 CONG. Rac. H-2988-92 (1991).
207. Id. at H2988.
208. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2066.
209. Native Americans are United States citizens. See generally Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43
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of sovereignty were disregarded and tones of intolerance toward tribes
were conspicuous. While this decision represents a new threat to the
Indian community, given recent Supreme Court pronouncements con-
cerning Indian rights, the result is hardly surprising.
Tribes must develop the political strength to effectively seek solu-
tions to their unique problems. Resolve among the various Indian na-
tions and inter-tribal cooperation is imperative if an already endangered
way of life is to be preserved in some meaningful way. Congress and the
judiciary must be urged to re-examine their argumentation and reason-
ing. These American institutions must restore to the Indians the fruits of
promises made many years ago-the inherent right to autonomous
power within Indian country.
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